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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL AND THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CENTRISM
Mark Tushnet*

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. By John C. Jeffries, Jr. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1994. Pp. xii, 690. $30.00.
J.

INTRODUCTION

John Jeffries's 1 respectful biography of Justice Lewis F. Powell
carefully describes how Powell found himself at the Supreme
Court's center during his tenure. He was "the Supreme Court's
center of gravity" (p. 404) and its "guiding spirit" (p. 405). Jeffries's
work also provides an opportunity to reflect on the kind of centrism
Powell endorsed - or, perhaps better, embodied. Powell "instinctively recoiled from extreme positions" (p. 409); his centrism was so
deeply a part of his persona that he hardly chose it in the way the
term endorsed suggests. As Powell became more comfortable in his
judicial role, the balance that his centrism expressed turned out to
be a rather direct reflection of his own views about what constitutes
sound public policy.
His record on the Supreme Court demonstrates the limits of the
social vision of the class he represented. Powell came from a relatively well-to-do background in the solid white Virginia middle
class. His family was neither rich nor grindingly poor, though it
experienced some tight moments during economic downturns.
Powell's talents and his drive to achieve, which Jeffries stresses
throughout, propelled him to the upper echelon of corporate
America. For example, Powell's support for abortion rights, qualified by his refusal to find unconstitutional limits on public funding
for abortions, reflects his experience with people who needed access to abortions and could locate private resources to pay for them,
rather than experience with equally needful people who could not
locate the necessary private resources. Powell's jurisprudence of
balancing may be suitable only for a Court whose members have a
more capacious social vision than Powell. Perhaps Justices like
Powell would do better if they adhered to a more formalist jurispru* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971,
M.A. 1971, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank L. Michael Seidman for his comments on a
draft of this review.
1. Emerson G. Spies Professor of Law, Horace W. Goldsmith Resident Professor of Law,
and Academic Associate Dean, University of Virginia; law clerk to Justice Powell 1973-74.
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dence, in which adherence to rules screens out some considerations
that a "balancer" might take into account. Of course, the particular
rules a formalist followed would matter a great deal; the hope, however, would be to develop rules that screen out invidious considerations that, perhaps subconsciously, influence a balancer's decisions.
To Jeffries, Powell was a "pragmatic conservative" (p. 470),
whose opinions were a "mosaic of accommodation, highly differentiated and strongly variegated but of a generally conservative hue"
(p. 403). Jeffries shows, however, that Powell's views on his judicial
role changed somewhat during his tenure. Arriving at the Court
essentially untutored in constitutional law, Powell began with his
instinctive conservatism, which took the form of an undifferentiated
posture of "judicial restraint" that he invoked in nearly all contexts
without serious consideration of the possibility that restraint might
be appropriate in some contexts but not others. As he gained experience, Powell became more confident in the propriety of judicial
activism - at least when its results fit within his social vision (pp.
425, 499). As Jeffries puts it, "[t]he principle [of restraint] declined
into an attitude" (p. 425).
In his analysis of Powell's work on the Supreme Court, Jeffries
primarily concentrates on abortion, race relations, and capital punishment cases.2 Because Jeffries limits his treatment of the Court's
work so severely, his picture of Powell's centrism is slightly out of
focus·. 3 By examining some materials Jeffries omits, I hope to adjust
the focus in a way that brings out more clearly the limits of Powell's
jurisprudence.
Describing a case early in Powell's tenure,4 Jeffries writes that
Powell had "no interest in mak[ing] a deal" (p. 304) about what the
law was or should be. Elsewhere, however, Jeffries shows Powell
working with his colleagues to formulate a position acceptable to
enough of them to constitute a majority or a plurality. So, for example, in the 1976 death penalty cases,5 Powell worked with Justices John Paul Stevens and Potter Stewart to uphold death penalty
statutes that, in their view, sufficiently limited the states' discretion
2. There is also a chapter on the Nixon tapes case. Pp. 371-'.l7.
3. This is not a severe criticism of Jeffries's well-written and engaging work, which is long
enough to tax general readers. If Jeffries had included more legal detail, he might have made
the book substantially less attractive to that audience. I do believe that a somewhat less
austere treatment of Powell's work on the Supreme Court might have improved the book.
This is particularly true because some other pages in the book seem to be padding. See, e.g.,
p. 27 (describing the Virginia Military Institute solely, it seems, because it was located in the
same town as Powell's college); pp. 98-103, 109-12 (describing some aspects of military operations during World War II); pp. 353-69 (describing the consequen~ of Roe v. Wade, particularly its impact on constitutional theory).
4. Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
5. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
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in the administration of the death penalty. 6 Powell seems to have
"made deals" in such instances, but close examination of Powell's
actions shows that Jeffries is right: Powell rarely negotiated over
opinions, in part because his position at the Court's center meant
that his colleagues had to move to meet him, and in part because his
perception of himself as a centrist led him to believe that the law
must be what he thought it was. I use two cases, one quite obscure
and one of renewed importance today, to illuminate Powell's jurisprudence of centrism.
II.

MURGIA AND REsHAPING POWELL'S ROLE

In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,1 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a Massachusetts statute requiring all state police officers to retire at the age of fifty. Although
the published majority opinion occupies only ten pages in the
United States Reports, it resulted from an extended controversy
within the Court that, in my view, affected Powell's understanding
of his place on the Court's political and jurisprudential spectrum.
The majority agreed that the statute at issue in the case should
be subject only to minimum scrutiny or rationality review.8 Chief
Justice Warren Burger assigned the opinion to Justice William J.
Brennan, probably believing that Brennan could do nothing in the
opinion to advance the liberal cause. Brennan circulated a draft of
the opinion in January of 1976 that immediately set Justice William
Rehnquist on edge. Brennan used the occasion to reinterpret the
Court's recent rationality review cases. Gerald Gunther had
pointed out that the rationality review test the Court seemed to apply in its previous cases actually had some "bite" because several of
the statutes invalidated in those cases could readily be justified by
some imaginable state purposes.9 Brennan's reformulation of rationality review attempted to incorporate those cases in a new,
more flexible standard.
Rehnquist tried a preemptive strike. Explaining that he would
not write a separate opinion for "a couple of weeks," Rehnquist
6. Pp. 425-26; see also Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Chief Justice Warren
Burger (Dec. 17, 1981), in Wtlliam J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter Brennan Papers], box 581, file 7 (discussing deliberations on Nixon v. Fitzgerald) ("[I]t is evident
that a Court opinion is not assured if each of us remains with our first preference votes.... I
am now prepared to defer to the wishes of you, Bill Rehnquist and Sandra and prepare a
draft opinion •.•."). Although it appears as if Powell were negotiating a compromise, he was
merely reverting to one of the two "versions" of the Court's opinion that he had prepared
when counsel had first argued the case.
7. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
8. Murgia, 421 U.S. at 312-13.
9. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term- Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1,
18-20 (1972).
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sent Brennan a letter "for [his] benefit (?)" expressing concern
about the way in which Brennan stated the standard of rationality
review, which would, in Rehnquist's view, "give the courts more
leeway in striking down state legislation."10 Although Brennan
drew his standard - "reasonable, not arbitrary, and ... [resting]
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation"11 - from prior cases, Rehnquist thought that Brennan had transformed its meaning,
particularly by restating the test to require a relationship between
the law at issue and "the state's announced objective."12 For Rehnquist, the standard "ought to be simply stated and ought to virtually
foreclose judicial invalidation except in the rare, rare case where
the legislature has all but run amok and acted in a patently arbitrary
manner." 13
In his February 9 reply, Brennan agreed that his draft did indeed offer "a more :flexible rule" of the "minimum scrutiny" standard than Rehnquist supported, but he argued that the Court's
cases had "evolved" to the point his draft described. 14 Brennan
pointed out that he could not explain several recent cases by relying
on as loose a standard as the one Rehnquist suggested. The fairand-substantial-relation standard, Brennan wrote, came from another half-dozen cases, which, although "fall[ing] into the twilight
zone of equal protection," were "part of the warp and woof of
equal protection law."15 Furthermore, though he thought that he
and Rehnquist might disagree on whether courts should judge a
statute only in relation to the purposes the state articulated, Brennan considered it unnecessary to determine in Murgia whether the
Court should come up with purposes if the state had not; here, he
said, the state had articulated a purpose sufficient to justify the
statute.16
Brennan circulated his correspondence to the other Justices on
February 12 with a cover letter stating that Rehnquist's position
was "at odds with statemen~ in a number of equal protection cases

10. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice William J. Brennan 1 (Jan. 30,
1976), in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter Marshall Papers], box
165, file 8. The file on Murgia is not included in Justice Brennan's papers at the Library of
Congress.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William H. Rehnquist 1 (Feb. 9,
1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 3.
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... over the past half century." 17 Perhaps because the correspondence clarified Brennan and Rehnquist's disagreement about the
appropriate amount of flexibility in the minimum rationality standard, the case made "little progress" toward disposition for a
month. 18
Meanwhile, a side issue - the political participation of the affected group - had come to distract some Justices. In explaining
why the mandatory retirement statute did not have to satisfy any
strict standard of review, Brennan referred to "the political clout of
the aged."19 Justice Harry Blackmun thought that lack of "political
clout" might justify more stringent review, but he was "hesitant to
go beyond that. "20 Though Justice Powell agreed with "much" of
Brennan's reasoning, he too rejected what he called Brennan's
"central position that a high degree of political participation in itself
is sufficient to support the conclusion that those of middle age do
not form a suspect class. "21
By the beginning of April it seemed that Brennan's opinion
might not get a single additional vote. Powell circulated an opinion
attempting to :flesh out in some detail an analysis of political power
adequate to the case. In the first section of the opinion, Powell
claimed that neither "high numerical representation" nor "the
existence of a body of remedial legislation" was enough to "remove
a group that displays the other indicia" from the "suspect" category.22 He argued that relying on remedial legislation, for example,
"could penalize those who properly seek legislative rather than judicial solutions to problems of discrimination."23 Nonetheless,
Powell offered other reasons why the Court should not apply
heightened scrutiny in this case; because the statute forced retirement at age fifty, it encompassed more than "the elderly."24 Furthermore, "persons of mature age," Powell wrote, "have not
suffered any deprivation of political power," and "may have a
unique influence" on legislation due to seniority systems.25
17. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Conference (Feb.12, 1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10. Justice Potter Stewart had circulated a concurring opinion taking
issue with Brennan's draft, to which Brennan's cover letter also refers.
18. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Wtlliam J. Brennan (Mar. 11, 1976),
in Marshall Papers, supra note 10. Justice Thurgood Marshall, normally Brennan's ally, was
in dissent, believing the statute to be unconstitutional.
19. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Rehnquist, supra note 14, at 1.
20. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan, supra note 18.
21. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion (Mass. Bd. of Retirement et al. v. Murgia)
(Apr. 7, 1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10, at 2.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id.
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The second section of Powell's draft, citing Gunther's article, basically agrees with Brennan's proposition that the Court's application of "minimum rationality" review had become more flexible.
Powell discussed the ways in which courts might identify "legitimate" state purposes and cautioned against "imagin[ing] policy
where none has been indicated by the legislature."26 Brennan conferred with Powell and adopted Powell's opinion.27 Even then, "no
Court developed,"28 and Brennan turned the opinion over to Powell. Powell revised his draft "to attain as much unanimity as possible on a general formulation of the rational basis equal protection
test." 29
Rehnquist continued to find the Powell-Brennan position unsatisfactory. Powell's test, he wrote, "is really a very significant departure from constitutional adjudication as developed in the decisions
of this Court."30 In a letter conveying in firm tones the depth of his
disagreement with the Powell-Brennan position, Rehnquist stated
that an extensive discussion of whether the statute affected a suspect classification was unnecessary, and he particularly objected to
Powell's treatment of "the relative success of the aged in obtaining
their wishes legislatively."31 Rehnquist understood, however, that
this discussion of political participation was not central to the outcome, and he focused more on what he called the "expansion" of
the rational basis test.32
Rehnquist had two main concerns. Although he agreed that
state statutes had to pursue "legitimate" purposes, he was unconvinced that the Court needed to elaborate on that requirement.33
In particular, he thought that Powell's discussion of hypothesized
state purposes was confusing. Here Rehnquist's tone became especially critical; he claimed that one implication of a phrase in a footnote was "difficult to support in law or logic"34 and he complained
that the basis for another suggestion "escapes me entirely."35 Furthermore, Rehnquist had "the most serious reservations about that
portion of [Powell's] memorandum which seems to contemplate the
bodily assumption into the Equal Protection Clause of Professor
26. Id. at 7.
27. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Conference (May 19, 1976), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 10.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 9 (May 25,
1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10.
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 3-4.
33. Id. at 5-6.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id.

1860

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 93:1854

Gunther's article."36 That article, Rehnquist wrote, "seems to me
to be in the area of political science, rather than of constitutional
law."37 Here too Rehnquist focused on how to treat legislative purposes. Rehnquist concluded with a "peroration" because he had
"gotten [him]self sufficiently worked up."38 According to Rehnquist, the "basic shortcoming" of Powell's analysis was that
it sets up this Court ... to evaluate a legislative decision to implement
a particular purpose by enacting some provision of a given statute. It
seems to me almost inconceivable that we could correctly conclude
that a group of legislators, all devoting a good part of their time to the
art of legislation, chose a means which was not "genuinely" related to
their purpose.39

Needing votes from Justices who had not yet responded, Powell
removed most of the discussion of legislative purpo_se from the
draft,40 though he had earlier said that he did not believe the Justices were "far apart in substance."41 Even this did not comfort
Rehnquist. But Rehnquist agreed "to do some accommodating of
[his] own" and to "swallow [his] objections ... if the resolution of
this battle is by agreement to be left for another day."42 He was
willing to let Powell's discussion of purpose stand only if the opinion also presented "both sides of the doctrinal dispute" by including
a quotation of Rehnquist's preferred standard.43 "Admittedly,"
Rehnquist wrote, "this is inconsistent with your analysis, but it will
not be the first time that an Equal Protection opinion has contained
verbal inconsistencies. "44
By this point it was clear that the Court was hopelessly divided
on equal protection theory, or at least on the verbal formulations
that conscientious Justices used to describe standards of review.
Powell apparently was uncomfortable with writing an opinion that,
in both his and Rehnquist's eyes, was internally inconsistent, and he
circulated a final draft that was "about as blandly written as one can
write. "45 The draft, he told his colleagues, left each of them "free to
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 10-11.
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Conference (June 7, 1996), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10.
41. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference (May 19, 1976), supra note 27.
42. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1-2 (June 9,
1976), in Marshall Papers, supra note 10.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.
45. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Conference (June 15, 1976), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 10.
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'fight again another day.' "46 This final draft became the Court's
opinion.
Although the published opinion in Murgia reflects nothing of
Powell's struggle with the case, the Court's contentious deliberations helped shape Powell's jurisprudence. When he circulated his
final draft, Powell told his colleagues that "my zeal for writing has
been so thoroughly dampened by this spring's experience, that it
may be sometime before I venture forth again."47 For the next few
years he regularly referred to the "struggle" in Murgia. 48
Jeffries notes that Powell came to the Court knowing little about
constitutional law (p. 334). He did, however, see himself as a reasonable person. In Murgia that reasonableness translated almost
directly into constitutional doctrine. As Powell understood what
had happened, Rehnquist stood on his right, refusing to adopt what
Powell believed to be an entirely reasonable position and fighting
for a purely theoretical point, while Brennan stood on his left, being
as reasonable as one could ask. Because Powell equated centrism
with reasonableness, he came to see Brennan as closer to him in
judicial philosophy than his more conservative colleagues. Brennan's liberalism, in short, seemed to Powell more reasonable than
Rehnquist's conservatism. The Murgia experience showed Powell
that it might be relatively easy for an individual Justice like himself
to maintain a centrist jurisprudence, but that it was another for the
Court as an institution to do so - reasonableness could not always
be equated with centrism for the Court as a whole. Moreover, the
experience in Murgia contributed to what Jeffries describes as Powell's increasing willingness to set aside legislative judgments (p. 425)
even though in that case Powell, Brennan, and Rehnquist all agreed
that the Massachusetts statute was constitutional. Because Powell
believed he was so reasonable, he believed that whatever judgments
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William H. Rehnquist
(United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz) (Nov. 10, 1980), in Brennan Papers, box 555, file
2 (mentioning "getting caught in a 'cross-fire' " in Murgia); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (United States v. Crews) (Dec. 14, 1979), in Brennan

Papers, box 523, file 6 ("This case reminds me a little bit of Murgia."); Letter from Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens (McAdams v. McSurely) (Apr. 12, 1978), in
Brennan Papers, box 474, file 7 ("I have already spent as much time on this 'loser' as Bill
Brennan and I did a couple of years ago in Murgia."); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
to Justice William J. Brennan (Craig v. Boren) (Dec. 6, 1976), in Brennan Papers, box 439,
file 5 ("Although I have some reservations as to the breadth of your discussion of the applicable standard for equal protection analysis (Murgia revisited!), I am in substantial agreement with you."). Although Powell revised his draft opinion in Murgia, I think his actions
are not well described as dealmaking. His discomfort with the process, reflected in his later
comments, suggests that Powell reluctantly acquiesced in a course his colleagues forced on
him.
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he reached on constitutional matters were by definition reasonable
ones.
ill.

PLYLER

v. .Doe AND

"ACCOMMODATING" POWELL

Plyler v. Doe49 involved the constitutionality of a Texas statute

denying a free public education to children of aliens who were present in the United States unlawfully. Several issues occupied the
Court's attention. The Fourteenth Amendment's first sentence and
its Privileges and Immunities Clause both refer to "citizens,"
though the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses refer to
"persons."50 Were illegal aliens covered by the Amendment? Second, if the Amendment did cover illegal aliens, were illegal aliens
or their children a "suspect class" so that the government could
deny benefits to them 'only if the reasons for the denial were exceptionally strong?_ Third, even if Texas's statute did not have to satisfy
the strict scrutiny given to laws adversely affecting suspect classes,
was it a rational response to the problems Texas faced?51 Justices
Brennan and Powell played crucial roles in resolving these
questions.
Justice Brennan's typed notes for his conference presentation
start with his conclusion that the Texas statute was unconstitutional.52 He thought that strict scrutiny "could be applied" because
the statute ~'makes a suspect classification based on alienage."53
"Alternatively," Brennan claimed, "we might follow the line we
have taken in the illegitimate children cases," in which the Court
did not invoke strict scrutiny but invalidated statutes "if they are
not substantially related to permissible state interests. "54 He believed that "the state interests are insufficient to sustain" the Texas
statute.55 "The state interest in controlling illegal immigration"
Brennan continued, "is simply not a permissible state interest that is a federal matter."56 He further stated that the evidence did
not show that the state's interest in saving money was substantially
related to the classification: "The state acknowledges that illegal
49. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Rattling around in the case was a question the Justices described as "preemption":
Was the problem of illegal immigration so inherently a national matter that the federal government could prevent individual states from interfering with national policy even by adopting rules like Texas's that appeared to discourage illegal immigration? TEX. Eouc. CooE
ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
52. Justice Wtlliam J. Brennan, 'fyped Notes for Conference Discussion 1, in Brennan
Papers, box 590, file 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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immigrants help to contribute financially to the school by property
taxes and sales taxes," and there was no evidence that "children of
illegal immigrants are more expensive to educate."57
Although Justice Powell leaned toward striking the statute
down, he found the case "hard."58 Powell focused on the fact that
the "classification is children," and, he said, "they have no responsibility for being there."59 Indeed, Powell emphasized that it is "hard
to think of a category more helpless."6° Although he, did not think
that education was a "fundamental right," Powell did believe that
"if some children get it," the state cannot "<;leny it to a narrowly
drawn classification applicable to a real resident," as were the children in this case.61
.
As Brennan put it later, the conference discussion produced "no
clear consensus" about the appropriate level of scrutiny.62 He set
to work on an opinion that would gain the necessary five votes. In
late January he took what he called "the unusual step of circulating" a draft opinion only to the Justices - Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, and Stevens - who had said they would strike the Texas
statute down, rather than to the full Court.63 The draft, he said, was
driven by his "particular concern with a statute, such as this, that
sought to deprive innocent children not remotely responsible for
their plight of their right to an education."64
As Brennan noted, the draft "retie[d] both on ·the nature of the
classification, and on the importance of education."65 The conference discussion had not focused on whether education was a fundamental right, and Powell, whose vote Brennan needed, said it was
not. Brennan therefore explained that, though "a strong case for
heightened scrutiny could be made simply on the basis of the class
discriminated against," the opinion would be "less broad" if it invoked the importance of education as well.6° Limiting the decision
in this way, Brennan explained, would still leave the states "fairly
broad prerogatives in legislating with respect to illegal aliens in
51. Id. at 1-2. Despite Brennan's mention of the federal interest in controlling illegal
immigration, he was not enthusiastic about relying on a straight preemption theory, which, he
thought, would have to deny states authority more broadly than the precedents indicated. Id.
at 2.
58. Justice Wtlliam J. Brennan, Notes on Conference Discussion, in Brennan Papers,
supra note 52.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Thurgood Marshall 1 (Jan. 25, 1982},
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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other contexts."67 This approach, which rooted the right to education in the particular history of the Fourteenth Amendment, was
"for that very reason largely self-limiting and unlikely to force us
down any uncharted paths in the future."68 He concluded that the
Texas statute "would fail under even an intermediate standard of
review," 69 and he suggested how he could rewrite his draft on that
theory. But, he warned, "exclusive reliance on the 'innocent children' rationale, [sic] would truncate our real concern here - that
whatever else the state may do with respect to illegal aliens, barring
the innocent children among them from basic education is most
perverse." 70
Brennan's cover letter and draft opinion clearly indicate that
Powell was his primary target.71 The introduction to the opinion
provides a general review of the different standards for equal protection review, concluding that "in this context an understanding of
both the nature of the classification, and the right denied, are integral" to determining the standard of review.12
The first main part of Brennan's draft argues that the statute
involved a suspect classification.73 It begins with a general overview: "Certain classifications are empirically more likely than
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality," Brennan wrote.74 "The experience of our Nation has
taught us that a conscious or unconscious, but in any event constitutionally unacceptable, prejudice is likely to manifest itself in the legislature's treatment of some groups." 75 Brennan then pointed out
that "illegal aliens display many of the characteristics of those 'discrete and insular minorities' for which the Constitution offers a special solicitude."76 For example, "[!]awfully resident aliens may have
some access to political forums," while "illegal aliens are understandably reluctant to risk exposure by bringing their complaints to
the attention of public agencies ...."77 Because of "lax enforcement" of the immigration laws, Brennan explained, there was a
"very real specter of a permanent caste of persons, welcomed as a
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1-2.
71. Id.; Justice William J. Brennan, Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Jan. 25, 1982}, in
Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
72. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion, supra note 71, at 17.
73. Id. at 18-23.
74. Id. at 18.
75. Id. at 19. On unconscious prejudice, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 {1987).
76. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion, supra note 71, at 19.
77. Id.
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source of cheap labor, but nevertheless unable to participate in the
benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful
residents. "78
After describing why the class illegal aliens might warrant strict
scrutiny, Brennan turned to the issue of scrutiny of laws affecting
their children - "special members of that class:" 79 Perhaps state
legislatures had "unusual prerogatives" in connection with "persons
whose presence within the boundaries of the United States has
been the product of their wrongful conduct."80 But, Brennan argued, that could not be true about imposing "particular disabilities
on the children of such unlawful entrants."81 The parents, who
"elect[ed] to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of law[,]
might be asked to bear the burden of legislation designed to deter
their unlawful entry," but their children were "hardly similarly situated."82 Legislation "directing the onus of parent's [sic] misconduct
on his children does not comport well with our most fundamental
conceptions of justice. "83
This first part of Brennan's opinion concludes by agreeing that
"undocumented status" was not irrelevant to all permissible purposes, and therefore that it would be inappropriate to give heightened scrutiny whenever statutes adversely affected illegal aliens.84
"Nevertheless," Brennan continued, "immigration status is a characteristic over which the undocumented children ... have little or
no control." Brennan concluded that the class undocumented children shared "many of the more significant factors" that led the
Court to apply heightened scrutiny in other cases.85
The second part of Brennan's opinion examines whether "the
absolute denial of basic education" was "an interference" with a
fundamental right.86 Brennan conceded that the Constitution does
not explicitly guarantee the right to an education. But, quoting
Meyer v. Nebraska, he pointed out that "the American people have
always regarded education and the acquisition of knowledge as
matters of supreme importance."87 Children deprived of education
suffer, but "our Nation suffers too when select groups are denied
the opportunity to contribute to the community of ideas within
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id. at 21.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.

at 22.

at 23.
at 23-24.
at 24-25 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).
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which freedom and democracy thrive." 88 For Brennan, "public
schools provide the primary vehicle by which individual initiative
and merit are allowed to overcome the circumstances of birth." 89
Justice Brennan then offered a rather extensive survey of "[t]he
debates and actions of the Reconstruction Congress" to show that it
acknowledged "the importance of basic education as a means of
advancing the material and spiritual well-being of the individual"
and "the Nation's need for education in fulfilling its commitment to
equality." 90 He compiled statements from the Reconstruction Congress indicating a special concern that the South had denied
African-Americans access to education, and recognizing that "education is essential to the national welfare." 91 Education, to some
members of Congress, was "necessary to a republican form of govemment. "92 Although the generation that adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment might have "hesitated before imposing upon the
States the federal duty, and fiscal burden, of establishing a statewide system of free public education," they did believe that "equal
access to basic education" was "an essential aspect of the framework of equality embodied in" the Fourteenth Am.endment.93
Taking the two parts of his analysis together, Brennan concluded that heightened scrutiny was appropriate: "The Framers
recognized that by denying certain disfavc;>red groups access to basic
education, we deny to the members of those groups the ability to
advance their material well-being, to contribute productively to society, and the means to protect themselves within the structure of
our social and civic institutions."94 Brennan stated that Powell's
opinion for the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 95 which rejected an equal protection challenge to
Texas's system of school financing, was "far on the other end of the
equal protection spectrum."96 Denying basic education to "a discrete and historically demeaned group, solely on the basis of personal status ... parallels in significant respects the type of 'class or
caste' legislation with which the Equal Protection Clause is most
directly concerned. "97 The statute therefore had to "advance[ ]
some vital state need."98 The remainder of the opinion examines
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.

91.
98.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29 n.23 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1867)).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34-35.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion, supra note 71, at 35-36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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the purported state interests and finds them inadequate to support
the statute.99
Powell replied to the draft on January 30.10° "I view this case,"
he wrote, "in rather simplistic terms."101 Because some undocumented aliens were bound to remain in the United States, "[t]heir
children should not be left on the streets uneducated."102 He
agreed that heightened scrutiny was appropriate because the case
involved a class of "innocent children, uniquely postured/' but he
did want to emphasize that the classification was "a unique one." 103
He therefore disagreed with Brennan's discussion of suspect classifications. As written, Powell observed~ Brennan's draft "come[s]
very close to saying that all illegal aliens" are a discrete and insular

.
"ty 104
mmon.

'

Tu.ming to the issue of the right to an education, Powell began
by noting his nineteen years of service on public-school boards in
Virginia, which led him to "share [Brenn~'s] view as to the importance of education, particularly in a democracy."10s But, as he had
written in Rodriguez, he did not think there was a constitutional
right to an education, and so would not call education "a 'fundamental' right in the constitutional sense. " 106 He suggested emphasizing that "the state's own interest in not creating a subclass of
illiterate persons many of whom will remain in Texas" weighed
against Texas's statute.101
·
Powell ended his letter by calling Brennan's draft "an impressive piece of work" that he had "enjoyed reading."1os He stated,
however, that he was "a little uneasy" about the broad sweep of the
draft, which might lead to "inferences ... in other connections not
clearly fore_seeable."109 He said that he would join the judgment,
and he offered to join the opinion as well if Brennan reworked it to
"focus[] ... specifically on this t,nrlquely discrete class."110
99. Id. at 36-41.
100. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (Jan. 30, 1982),
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
101. Id. at 1.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Among the "[r]elatively [m]inor [p]oints" Powell made was a concern that Brennan's statements about unconscious prejudice might not easily be "square[d] with" the
Court's insistence that only intentional discrimination violated the Constitution. Id. at 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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A few days later Brennan responded to Powen.111 Displaying
his usual style, Brennan said that it seemed clear to him that "it will
not be difficult to find common ground," and he perceived "the
most appropriate opinion for the Court[] in very nearly the terms"
Powell suggested.112 Diplomatically, Brennan suggested that his
own draft did not really "wander very far afield."113 He pointed out
several places in his draft stating expressly that there were good
reasons not to hold illegal aliens to be a suspect classification.
Passages that Powell read as analogizing illegal aliens to other suspect classifications should be read, Brennan wrote, to "highlight the
unique nature of the subclass of 'undocumented children.' "114
Moreover, Brennan suggested, the draft's emphasis on the interaction between the classification and the right actually narrowed the
opinion's breadth. He did think, however, "that the discrete nature
of the class heightens for them the significance of education."115
Brennan attached a redrafted discussion of suspect classifications.116 The new version omitted the sentence about unconscious
prejudice and moved to a long footnote the point about the reluctance of illegal aliens to bring their complaints to public authorities.
He thus downplayed the general treatment of illegal aliens, but it
remained in the opinion. Brennan did ask Powell to "suggest a way
to abbreviate the discussion of this aspect of the children's unique
circumstance still more."117
Brennan's letter also addresses Powell's concerns about the
draft's discussion of the right to education. He emphasized that his
draft stated, and the evidence included in it showed, that "there is
just no support in [the congressional] debates ... for the idea that a
state has any affirmative obligation to establish a system of public
education. " 118 Here too he invited Powell to "suggest any wording
that you think might better state these conclusions if you feel that
the slightly obscure statements presently in the text are unsatisfactory. "119 But, Brennan continued, he did want to "preserve" the
conclusion that "the history . . . confirms our shared view that we
111. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1982),

in Marshall Papers, supra note 52.
112. Id. at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Justice Wiiliam J. Brennan, Proposed Revisions to Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe)
(Feb. 2, 1982), attached to Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell, supra note 111.
117. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell, supra note 111, at 2.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 3.
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are to look closely on the absolute denial of education to certain
discrete groups of children."120
Brennan's strategy seems clear enough. As he said, his first
draft did incorporate pretty much all that Powell expressly wanted.
As Powell understood, though, the draft contained phrases and general discussions that Justices and lawyers could detach from the
case's "unique" setting and use in later opinions. and briefs. Brennan tried his best to preserve the statements that might have had
broader implications by pointing out that the draft indeed dealt
with Powell's express concerns. But, on the whole, neither the letter nor the revised part of the draft was a large concession to Powell's concerns. Perhaps Brennan was testing the depth of Powell's
commitment to his own views.
After receiving Brennan's letter and the redrafted discussion of
suspect classifications, Powell responded by saying that he thought
the revision was "a substantial clarification," but that he had decided to write separately.121 Powell explained: "My concern as to
the 'open endedness' of equal protection prompts me to be extremely cautious in this case as to the reach of the precedent we
set."122 Because the case was "quite unique," Powell "thought it
prudent to write less exhaustively than [Brennan's] opinion."123 He
acknowledged that Brennan too had tried "to circumscribe [the
Court's] holding narrowly," but in the end Powell wanted to "focus
solely on the unique status of these children."124
Brennan then shortened his draft and circulated it to the entire
Court.125 Although Brennan told Powell that he believed that the
revisions "effectively preserve, and support," Powell's position in
Rodriguez, 126 actually none of the changes affected the matters that
concerned Powell.
Powell circulated his own separate opinion the following day.127
Like the opinion Powell eventually published,128 his draft stresses
that the case involved "a form of discrimination against children for
the acts of their parents," and he relied more explicitly than Bren120. Id.

121. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (Feb. 4, 1982),
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Justice William J; Brennan, Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Feb. 8, 1982), in Brennan
Papers, supra note 52.
126. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Feb. 8, 1982),
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
127. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Feb. 9, 1982), in Brennan
Papers, supra note 52.
128. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
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nan had on the Court's decisions invalidating some statutes discriminating against the children of unmarried parents.129 Most notably,
he included a long footnote disagreeing with the application of
"strict scrutiny" and with the suggestion he drew from Brennan's
draft that illegal aliens formed a suspect classification.130 Powell
''wholly reject[ed]" Brennan's "intimation" that "adult illegal aliens
guilty of violating our laws may be entitled to 'heightened judicial
solicitude.' "131 Furthermore, he expressly disagreed with the suggestion that education was a fundamental right.132
There matters rested, at least in writing, for about a month until
the other Justices formulated their views. In early March Justice
Blackmun started the discussion up again, reminding Brennan that
in the early discussions Blackmun had been the only Justice interested in pursuing a preemption analysis because "any equal protection route seems to ·encounter analytical difficulties. "133 In the
hope of getting a majority opinion by inducing Powell to join,
Blackmun suggested "address[ing] the case squarely in traditional
equal protection fundamental rights terms."134
Blackmun's suggestions tried to address Powell's expressed concerns by eliminating the suspect classification analysis entirely and
bolstering the fundamental rights analysis. 135 Unfortunately for
Blackmun and Brennan, Powell had merely focused on the suspect
129. Powell, Draft Opinion, supra note 127, at 1.
130. Id. at 3 n2.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 4 n.2.
133. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan 1 (Mar. 10,
1982), in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
134. Id.
135. Blackmun thought that "some modicum of education" would be "fundamental" because it "is necessary to preserve rights of expression and participation in the political process, and therefore to preserve individual rights generally." Id. He suggested a preemptionlike response to the objection that "illegal aliens have no individual rights to preserve": some
of the children in the case were going to be permanent residents, and some were "not presently deportable." Id. at 1-2. As a result, "[m]any of these children .•• have, or will have,
political and related rights." Id. at 2. Furthermore, the state had no way to identify which
children would be in that group, and therefore could not "deprive the entire group of the
right to attend school." Id. If the Court followed this analysis, Blackmun wrote, "one could
delete the reference to illegal aliens as a suspect class and, also, the analogy of illegal alien
children to illegitimates." Id.
Not surprisingly, Justice Marshall added his voice in support of "almost all" of Blackmun's suggestions: Marshall had always wanted to emphasize the importance of the connection between education and political rights, from his argument before the Court in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to his dissent in Rodriguez. Letter from Justice
Thurgood Marshall to Justice William J. Brennan (Mar. 10, 1982), in Brennan Papers, supra
note 52.
Justice Stevens, stating that "there are several different lines of legal analysis that require
the result that you reach," said that he would accept either a fundamental rights analysis or a
suspect classification analysis, whichever Brennan found necessary to get a majority opinion.
Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William J. Brennan (Mar. 10, 1982), in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
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classification analysis without meaning to suggest that he could go
along with treating education as a fundamental right. Brennan's
second draft de-emphasized the former but retained the latter. Not
having heard from Powell about the fundamental rights analysis,
Blackmun perhaps believed that Powell did not have misgivings
about it. Powell, however, soon disabused his colleagues of that
idea. 'I\vo days after Blackmun sent his letter to Brennan, Powell
wrote that it had "prompted [him] to reexamine [his] position."136
He indicated that "[a]s important as education has been in the life
of my family for three generations, I would hesitate before creating
another heretofore unidentified right. " 137 He "inclined" to Stevens's position that thy Texas statute was simply irrational, "penalizing these children" in pursuit of an "insubstantial" state
interest138 - saving money now without attention to the costs the
state would have to bear later if the children grew up without an
education. Here he thought that the analogy to illegitimate children was appropriate.
Powell concluded his letter with the thought that a majority
opinion might not be so important in this case: "The very fact that
we have not identified any prior case, or even any established principle, that controls this unique case suggests that the precedential
force of a judgment alone will not be great."139 Without a majority
opinion, he added, the Court would be "free to meet unforeseeable
situations without being bound by a decision tailored to redress a
peculiar and unprecedented type of injustice."140
Powell's argument was not enough, howeyer, to stop Brennan.
A month later Brennan sent Powell, but not his colleagues, a third
version of the opinion.141 Structurally the first draft had two main
parts: (i) a general discussion of why undocumented aliens might be
a suspect classification followed by an application of general principles to the special case of children of undocumented aliens, and (ii)
a general discussion of why education might be a fundamental right
followed by an application to the special case of denying education
to a group like those children. The second draft eliminates both the
general discussion of suspect classifications and the general discussion of undocumented aliens. Brennan's third draft then eliminates
the general discussion of education as a fundamental right. Claiming that he had incorporated Powell's analysis, Brennan concluded
136. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1 (Mar. 12,
1982), in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2.
140. Id.
141. Justice William J. Brennan, Draft Opinion (Plyler v. Doe) (Apr. 5, 1982), in Brennan
Papers, supra note 52.
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that he "no longer required any lengthy discussion of legislative material or any complex analytic framework." 142 But, in response to
an argument he found implicit in the proposed dissents, Brennan at
last added a discussion of preemption. He told Powell that such a
discussion was appropriate because the dissenters apparently believed that "undocumented status, without more, carried with it a
State prerogative to deny these children an education," a belief that
"rests, at heart, on the implications of federal law."143
Powell immediately responded to Brennan's new draft, thanking
Brennan "for making this substantial effort to accommodate [his]
thinking." 144 He "suggested minor language changes" to "reflect
[his] strongly held conviction that an adult illegal alien is here in
willful violation of our laws."145 Although he "share[d] - and applaud[ed] - [Brennan's] sympathy for peoples all over the world
who would like nothing better than to live in our country," heargued that this "understandable desire is no justification for violating
our laws."146 Powell added parenthetically: "I wish a good many of
our own citizens, who seem to make a career out of criticizing the
United States, were more appreciative of the privilege of living in
this wondrous land of freedom and comparative plenty."147
After receiving Powell's letter and making the cJ,tanges he suggested, Brennan circulated the opinion to the Court. As one of
Marshall's clerks noted, "[t]he 'scuttlebutt' is that [Powell] has
agreed to join this draft,"148 which Powell immediately did.149 Powell then revised his separate opinion, converting it from a concurrence in the result to a simple concurrence and eliminating the nowunnecessary criticism of treating illegal aliens as a suspect
classification.150
The Court handed down its opinion on June 15, 1982. The next
day Powell sent Brennan a handwritten note congratulating him for
142. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Apr. 5, 1982),

in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
143. Id.
144. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (Apr. 7, 1982),
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. That comment suggests one of the difficulties Brennan faced: that Powell was
firmly committed to his position for "reasons" that may well have been other than rational,
which made accommodating them in any way other than complete acquiescence almost
impossible.
148. Note on Second Printed Draft Opinion {Plyler v. Doe) {Apr. 7, 1982), in Marshall
Papers, box 295, file 2.
149. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan {Apr. 8, 1982),
in Brennan Papers, supra note 52 (consisting only of the words "[p]lease join me").
150. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion {Plyler v. Doe) (June 7, 1982), in Brennan
Papers, supra note 52.
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the opinion, "especially on the painstaking and generous way you
wrote an opinion that accommodated our several differing views,
and finally obtained a Court."151 The final opinion, Powell said,
"will be in every text and case book on Constitutional law."152
Two aspects of the deliberations in Plyler are noteworthy. First,
of course, Powell did not really negotiate. He held his position and
watched Brennan move toward it.153 Second, the opinion drafting
process had several stages. At the outset Brennan articulated a
two-pronged theory to justify invalidating a statute that he and
Powell firmly believed was a seriously misguided public policy.
Powell insisted that Brennan first dilute one prong and then the
other..What resulted was an opinion that on one level had almost
no generative or doctrinal significance because it invoked too many
considerations. On another level, the opinion had profound doctrinal significance because one could interpret it to hold that the
Supreme Court will strike down statutes that are unconstitutional
when a majority of the Court thinks those statutes are unwise social
policy. Powell's jurisprudence produced an opinion that was almost
nothing more than a direct reflection of his views of social policy.
The Framers designed the Constitution, it appears, to allow judges
to strike down statutes that are, to as reasonable a person as Powell,
not sensible.
IV.

THE LIMITS OF POWELL'S SOCIAL VISION

Moderation and balance characterized Powell's understanding
of his centrist jurisprudence. Those terms, however, do not define
themselves. In Plyler, the moderate position came down to treating
a misguided social policy as unconstitutional. Powell did have doctrinal concerns, of course, but they were negative: he wanted to
ensure that the Court's decision did not express a doctrine that
might have troublesome implications for other cases. Powell's bal151. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan (June 16,
1982), in Brennan Papers, box 590, file 3.
152. Id.
153. Brennan had a similar experience with Justice Powell once before. In Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Brennan could not persuade Powell to join an opinion characterizing gender as a suspect classification. Instead of recasting it, Brennan let the opinion
go as a plurality opinion. See pp. 508-10. The contrast between the experience in Plyler and
Frontiero is intriguing. One possible explanation for the differences is that the Court decided
Frontiero in 1973. The Warren Court era had ended, but in 1973 the Court did not fully
realize the import of that fact - it was, after all, the Term of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
{1973). The possibility of planting seeds for later, liberal development remained open, or so
Brennan might have thought The Court decided Plyler almost a decade later. Liberal victories were by then few and far between. A transformed federal judiciary was in the making,
and there was little reason to think that the new judges would develop statements in plurality
opinions in a liberal direction. Brennan might have thought it would be better to get an
authoritative precedent in Plyler, no matter how narrow, than to hope for an opinion that
would encourage further liberal development
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ancing was his bulwark against a rule-based formalism, but it did
little to explain why the statute in Plyler was bad social policy, let
alone unconstitutional. In Murgia, the moderate position was simply being reasonable about things. Not infrequently, Powell's centrism amounted to taking the Constitution to mean what any person
as reasonable as Powell thought it to mean. Jeffries's description of
the course of Powell's thought about affirmative action provides an
example (pp. 469-78). As the cases came to the Court, he began to
understand the varying circumstances in which affirmative action
programs were adopted. Powell's "policy" was "to allow some affirmative action, but not too much; to permit race-consciousness,
but only where necessary" (p. 500).
In the employment context, Powell concentrated on the impact
of affirmative action programs on those he called "innocent employees,"154 and he was less sensitive to the impact on those Justice
Brennan called "equally innocent victims of racial discrimination."155 For Powell, affirmative action programs affecting hiring
were easier to support than those affecting promotions, and those
affecting layoffs were the most questionable.
Although Powell often stated that affirmative action programs
had to satisfy the highest standard of review,156 his views of the
equities of the varying situations meant that he applied that standard in a manner more consistent with the flexibility he and Brennan had sought in Murgia than with the rigidity ordinarily
associated with strict scrutiny. The result, as one of Marshall's law
clerks put it, was that "it [was] hard to tell whether ... [lower courts
had] 'misread' [a Powell opinion], since nobody knows what that
opinion stands for now that Justice Powell has retired." 157 Powell's
desire to achieve balance meant that the law he articulated reflected the balance he struck, not a balance accessible to any fair
reader of the cases.
Powell's most important discussion of affirmative action came in
Regents of the University of Califomia·v. Bakke, 158 in which the fact
that he spoke only for himself is symptomatic of what it meant to be
a centrist. He was, in his words, "a [']chief['] with no [']indians[']"
154. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 788-89 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).

155. Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The
View from the Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARYL. REv. 473, 539 n.399 (1995) (quoting
Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Conference 3 (Jan. 29, 1976), in Marshall
Papers, box 162, file 5).
156. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
157. Tushnet, supra note 155, at 540 (quoting Carol Steiker, Bench Memo (City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.), in Marshall Papers, box 429, file 4).
158. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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when he announced the Court's judgment.159 Powell quickly concluded that the strictly numerical program adopted by the University of, California at Davis's medical school violated the
Constitution, but he wanted to preserve some flexibility for affirmative action programs that "[took] race into account."160 Early in the
Court's deliberations, Justice White made the cogent and unanswerable point that race-sensitive programs were indistinguishable
in principle from the Davis program: on the margin - that is, as
between two otherwise equal· candidates for; admission - a racesensitive. program operated to prefer the African-American candidate over the white candidate just as rigidly as Davis's did.161 For
Powell, however, race-sensitive programs were more moderate than
Davis's in Bakke, and, apparently for that reason alone, the Court
should consider race-sensitive programs constitutio~al (pp. 484-85).
Jeffries is appropriately critical of Powell's stance in the Bakke
case (pp. 469-73, 484). Powell approved the affirmative action program at Harvard College, which "merely" treated race as a "plus
factor" in admissions, but he disapproved of the apparently more
rigid plan challenged in Bakke. Jeffries understands that the
Harvard program was a more genteel way of accomplishing the
same results as the plan in Bakke, and that on the margins a plus
factor has precisely the same effect as that plan; Powell's position
was, as Jeffries says, "pure sophistry."162
The very gentility of the Harvard program, though, is what may
have mattered to Powell. Reviewing Powell's career as a whole,
one can see a pattern in which Powell could appreciate claims made
by those with whom he could readily identify, but he could not fully
appreciate claims made by those who seemed c:lifferent from him.
Powell's actions during the process of desegregation in Virginia
illustrate the pattern. Powell was chair of the Richmond school
board in the years following Brown v. Board of Education 163 and
was an important behind-the-scenes figure in the state's political
life. Virginia was the home of "massive resistance" 164 fo desegregation, and Powell did nothing in public and little in private to oppose
such resistance. Jeffries concludes that Powell "never really identified himself with the needs and aspirations of Virginia's black
school-children" (p.172). More broadly, Powell's views on desegre159. P. 494 {alteration in original); cf. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMAAcnoN AND nm SUPREME CoURT 141 (1988).
160. SCHWARTZ, supra note 159, at 96-97.
161. Tushnet, supra note 155, at 518-19.
162. P. 484. For a more extended discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 155.
163. 347 U.S. 483 {1954).
164. MARK v. TUSHNET, MAKING Cxvn. RIGHTS LAw: THURGOOD MARsHALL AND TiiE
SUPREME CoURT, 1936-1961, at 247-48 (1994).
TIVE
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gation were shaped by a social vision in which "the neighborhood
school" took on an almost iconic significance, whether or not it accomplished much of value, and whether or not it interfered with the
alternative social vision of integration's proponents.
Virginia's massive resistance to desegregation had two aspects.
One was a :flashy but legally meaningless public relations campaign
developed by James Jackson Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond
News-Leader. Kilpatrick revived the constitutional theory of interposition, according to which state governments could interpose
themselves between the national government and the state's citizens when the national government acted unconstitutionally.165
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson had been associated with a
version of interposition during the controversy over the Federal
Alien and Sedition Acts at the end of the eighteenth century. Their
version, though, was more complicated than Kilpatrick's, who drew
his arguments primarily from John C. Calhoun. In the nullification
crisis of 1832-33, Madison, at least, expressly rejected Calhoun's
version. 166
By the 1950s, the theory of interposition lacked any serious constitutional support. Powell found it completely ridiculous. He
wrote letters ~o Yirginia's governor decrying the theory (pp. 14649), and he engaged in a debate with Kilpatrick at a prestigious
Richmond private club (pp. 145-46). He even drafted a thirty-page
article challenging the theory as "a doctrine of chaos - not of law"
(p. 149). Notably, however, he withdrew the article from submission (pp. 149-50).
In private, then, Powell attacked the most extreme aspect of
massive resistance. In public, however, he did nothing. Jeffries
writes that "there was nothing Powell could have done" to thwart
massive resistance in 1956 (p. 150), but perhaps an important figure
like Powell could have reduced some of the political force behind
massive resistance if he had come out against interposition. To do
so, however, Powell would have had to engage in political discussions with people rather unlike himself. It was one thing to debate
James Jackson Kilpatrick at a Richmond private club; it would have
been quite another for Powell to take on the racist politicians and, even worse, their supporters - who sincerely believed in
interposition.167
165. Id. at 240-41.
166. For Jeffries's discussion of the theory, see pp. 137-39.
167. I say "sincerely believed" to exempt the leaders of Senator Harry Byrd's political
machine, who supported massive resistance because it was politically expedient. JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE CRis1s OF CoNSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD ORGANIZATION AND nra
Poum:s OF MAssIVE REsISTANCE (1976).
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Massive resistance had another aspect. Virginia's legislature enacted statutes making it exceedingly difficult for local school districts to take even the most modest- or, as it was later put, token
- steps toward eliminating segregated schools. The state took the
power of assigning students to particular schools away from local
boards and placed immense procedural obstacles in the way of any
individual student who sought to challenge his or her school assignment. The ultimate threat was to force schools to close rather than
desegregate.
Here Jeffries's argument that Powell could do little to thwart
massive resistance has more force. As a member of the Richmond
school board, Powell might have done something to begin the desegregation process there (p. 141). But the massive resistance statutes resulted from a large-scale political mobilization, in which
legislators from outside Richmond had the largest role. By the time
local districts were willing to begin desegregation, as in the state's
northern suburbs of Washington, D.C., and in Charlottesville, or by
the time the federal courts forced other districts to do so, Powell
was a member of the state board of education. There his power to
influence desegregation in any particular district was quite small.
As Jeffries puts it, on the state board Powell was "willing to accept
desegregation but was also supremely tolerant of the status quo" (p.
170).
Jeffries shows that Powell's actions in Virginia during the desegregation process were prudent and cautious. Powell was "disengaged" (p. 177) and "never took a leading role" on the issue of
desegregation (p. 172). These were, in.· Jeffries's terms, "sin[s] of
omission" (p. 172), which seems a fair assessment.168 Powell's sins
resulted from a temperament that sought balance and tried to hold
the extremes - those promoting massive resistance and those
seeking integration - at equal distance. It is not that Powell actively opposed desegregation, or that he disregarded the "aspirations" (p. 172) of Virginia's African Americans; it is just that he
could not quite give them the same weight he gave to the aspirations of those seeking to preserve neighborhood schools. When
one seeks to balance interests, the result is likely to be distorted to
the extent that one systematically undervalues the interests on one

168. Jeffries does discuss one "sin of commission," Powell's agreement with the state
school board's decision to waive a procedural requirement so that the Prince Edward County
School Board could reimburse parents for a portion of their expenses in sending their children to segregation academies while the county's schools were closed in the state's most
dramatic expression of massive resistance. Pp. 175-77. As Jeffries shows, though, the state
board's action in waiving the procedural requirement was routine. For Jeffries, Powell's vote
is "a particularly striking example of Powell's general disengagement from the problems of
desegregation." P. 177.
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side of the balance while giving full weight to the interests on the
other side.
Powell's limited social vision may account for his decisions in
abortion cases. Jeffries closes his discussion of the abortion cases
with an anecdote explaining that Powell understood the impact of
restrictive abortion laws because a messenger in his law firm had
helped someone obtain an illegal abortion that ended in the
woman's death (p. 347). Jeffries also stresses that Powell's conversations with one of his daughters "reinforced" his views (p. 347). It
is not hard to interpret Powell's votes in abortion cases as reflecting
the limits of his social vision. To the extent that restrictive abortion
laws adversely affected people like him and his family, he found
them unconstitutional; to the extent that they adversely affected
women who were not part of his social vision - the poor - he
found them constitutional.169
Similarly, Powell's now-famous comments during the deliberations over Bowers v. Hardwick110 are consistent with the view that
his social vision was limited. Powell believed that he had never
known a homosexual, and he said so to his gay law clerk (p. 521);
Justice Harry Blackmun perhaps unfortunately resisted the urge to
correct Powell's misunderstanding (p. 528). Not knowing who he
knew, Powell voted to uphold Georgia's statute making sodomy a
criminal offense. ·
Such limits emerge even in passing comments. Rhodes v. Chapman111 involved a challenge to overcrowded conditions at an Ohio
prison. The Court, in an opinion by Powell, rejected the challenge.
At one point, Powell inserted a sentence purporting to support the
Court's conclusion: "Many persons not confined in prisons, and not
always compelled by poverty, would welcome comparable sleeping
quarters" to those in the Ohio prison.172 Justice Marshall replied:
I know of no one who would voluntarily spend most of his time with
only 30 square feet to call his own, unless compelled by poverty or by
the State. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that no one would contend
that the conditions in which the poor are forced to live represent our
nation's standards of decency.113
169. Compare City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 {1983) (invalidating a twenty-four hour waiting period and other restrictions on the availability of abortions) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 {1980) (upholding a federal statute denying
reimbursement through the Medicaid system for abortions).
170. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
171. 452 U.S. 337 {1981).
172. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion (Rhodes v. Chapman) {May 4, 1981), in
Marshall Papers, box 277, file 3, at 10.
173. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion (Rhodes v. Chapman) (May 15, 1981), in
Marshall Papers, box 227, file 3, at 8 n.8.
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Powell tinkered with the sentence, and in the end he omitted it
from the published opinion. That he thought to write it in the first
place and that he persisted with it even after Marshall's initial comment, shows the limits of Powell's social vision.
There is an underside .to balance and centrism that Powell's
work on the Court also illustrates. Both principles can degenerate
into an effort to have things two ways. Too often on crucial matters
Powell tried to do this.
Powell's repudiation of his vote in Bowers is well-known. Soon
after his retirement, Powell said that, on reflection, he believed that
he had erred in casting the fifth vote to uphold Georgia's antisodomy statute (p. 530). Jeffries describes Powell's "waffl[ing]" on
the question of gay rights and his effort, feebly expressed in his concurring opinion in Bowers, to develop a compromise position that
would allow states to criminalize homosexual sodomy but not to
impose substantial criminal sentences for engaging in homosexual
activities (pp. 514-19).
Jeffries explains Powell's vote in Bowers by referring to Powell's
age - which in this context must mean his politically conservative
instincts - and the weakness of the Eighth Amendment theory he
developed to claim the cent'er against the advocates of gay rights on
the left and the bigotry of Chief Justice Warren Burger's position
on the right (pp. 520-24). But, as Jeffries acknowledges, in Bowers
Powell "failed to act on his own best judgment" (p. 527).
Powell's change of heart on Bowers was k,nown before ieffries's
book. Jeffries reveals that Powell haq second thoughts about the
death penalty as well. In an interview with Jeffries, Powell stated
that he now believed that the Court wrongly decided McCleskey v.
Kemp 114 - not because he was wrong in rejecting McCleskey's evidence of racial discrimination in the administration of capital punishment, but because he could not justify capital punishment itself
(pp. 451-52). While on the Court, Powell characteristically had attempted to define a middle ground for death penalty jurisprudence.
Trying to work within a jurisprudence that was concerned with
avoiding the arbitrary imposition of death sentences, Powell agreed
that it was unconstitutional to require a capital sentence in any class
of cases - even though mandatory penalties would eliminate discretion at the sentencing stage175 - and that courts should allow
defendants facing the prospect of a death sentence to introduce any
mitigating evidence they had even though it reintroduced the possibility of arbitrary jury sympathy.116
174. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
175. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
176. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978).
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The difficulties of sustaining a centrist position on the death
penalty are perhaps best illustrated by the short-lived rule first articulated in a Powell opinion that juries could not hear evidence
about the impact of a murder on the victim's family and friends,
because, as Powell wrote, that would encourage juries to show
mercy to killers whose victims were especially unsympathetfo.111
Powell appears not to have understood that victim-impact evidence
was hardly necessary for that to happen or not to have seen the
connection between the concern he expressed in the victim-impact
case and McCleskey v. Kemp. In Mccleskey, he could have interpreted the statistical evidence to establish that juries were more
likely to impose the death penalty in cases in which the victim was,
as they saw it, "sympathetic," that is, white, than in cases in which
the victim was "unsympathetic," that is, African-American.
Powell eventually got impatient with the difficulty in actually
carrying out executions. Death penalty cases were a form of legal
guerrilla warfare that cast the legal process in a bad light. He
thought that lawyers for those under sentence of death had figured
out how to "manipulate[]" the Court's rules, and urged his colleagues to consider changing those rules.178 For a while Powell
hoped that the Court and Congress might defeat the death-penalty
guerrillas by speeding up the legal process and by closing off opportunities to raise new issues. But, according to Jeffries, the "bitter
education of the cases" and Powell's own declining regard for judicial restraint led Powell to the judgment that the middle ground he
regularly sought was simply untenable on the death penalty (pp.
452-53). In a memorandum to his colleagues in 1985, Powell suggested that "unless the habeas corpus statute is substantially
changed . . . the states should rescind their capital punishment
laws."179 He had "no doubt as to the constitutionality of capital
punishment," he wrote, "but I have grave doubts as to whether it
now serves the purposes of deterrence and retribution. "18°
On Bowers and capital punishment, Powell openly expressed his
change in views. His record on his actions during the process of
desegregation in ~chmond is more troubling. During his confirmation hearings, Powell presented himself as firmly committed to the
principles of Brown and as having acted in Richmond to implement
177. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991).
178. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Colleagues 2 (Sept. 4, 1985), in Brennan
Papers, box 700, file 7 (discussing Darden v. Wainwright); see also Memorandum from Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to the Conference 1 (Mar. 6, 1986), in Brennan Papers, box 719, file 16
(referring to "a gross abuse of the processes of our Court by counsel for Adams").
179. Letter from Justice Powell to Colleagues, supra note 178, at 2.
180. Id.
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Brown (pp. 234-36). As Jeffries shows, that was an exercise in selfrevisionism (pp. 297-98).
Commenting on Powell's retrospective self-justifications, Jeffries
notes Powell's "uneasiness about personal responsibility" and his
"attempt to distance himself from the consequences of his own
acts" (p. 429). Charitably put, the contrast between Powell's actions in Bowers, in the death penalty cases, and during the desegregation process in Richmond on the one hand, and his later
understanding of what the right thing to have done was on the
other, shows a failure of Powell's moral imagination.
It also shows Powell's concern that those whose judgments he
valued regard his actions well. When he actually had authority to
make decisions - as an important figure in Richmond's public life
and as a Justice - he could reasonably expect that the social
groups with which he was affiliated would see his decisions as sensible. Afterwards, though, he had to worry about the verdict of history. By repudiating actions that either had not stood the test of
time, for example his behavior in Richmond, or that might not do
so, for example his votes in Bowers and death penalty cases, Powell
could at least hope that historians would see him in a better light
than they would if all they had to go on was what he had actually
done.1s1
I find myself quite ambivalent about Powell's career. If asked to
assess Powell's performance, I am inclined tp focus on what he did
when he had power, not on what he later said he· should have done.
James Russell Lowell's verse comes to mind: "Once to every man
and nation comes the moment to decide, in the strife of Truth with
Falsehood, for the good or evil side[.]"182 Powell had more than
one moment to decide, and on balance he did not choose the good
side.
That conclusion, however, seems unduly harsh. We could not
reasonably expect that a person with Powell's affiliations would
have acted much differently. His social vision was limited, but one
part of it surely was a concern for historical reputation. His retrospective reconstructions of his views are therefore quite understandable. Although one might want a bit more self-awareness and
even embarrassment on Powell's part about the distance between
what he did and what he said he should have done, even that is
probably too much to ask of a person like him. Jeffries describes
Powell as a man of "ambition and reserve" (p. 220). His ambition
181. At least with respect to Bowers, Powell's "recantation" indeed seems to have improved his reputation. See, e.g., p. 530 (quoting Laurence Tribe as admiring Powell's willingness to admit error).
182. James Russell Lowell, The Present Crisis, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES RUSSELL
LoWELL 178, 180 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin 1891).
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led him to act as he did when he had power and afterward; his reserve made it impossible for him to understand his actions.
V.

SOCIAL VISION AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CENTRISM

Powell's jurisprudence of centrism suggests some broader conclusions. Perhaps balancing competing interests is a suitable way
for people with a capacious social vision to decide cases. They can
appreciate the, rel~vant consiperations no matter what case people
present to them: In desegregation cases they would appreciate the
aspirations of those seeking high-quality integrated schools and of
those seeking to preserve a social order with which they were comfortable; in affirmative action cases they would appreciate the concerns of innocent white victims of affirmative action programs and
of innocent African American victims of a historically embedded
system of race discrimination; in a capital punishment case they
would appreciate the conditions that led a murderer into the situation in which killing seemed the right thing to do and the devastation that criminal conduct wreaks on our society. Furthermore,
they would appreciate the value of developing a legal rule with sufficient generality to guide officials and citizens.
It would be senseless to believe that only those who come from
disadvantaged backgrounds can possibly have an appropriately capacious social vision to engage in the balancing of interests. After
all, everyone's social vision is limited, and we are all to some extent
the captives of our backgrounds. Powell's social vision was not as
narrow as it could have been: His empathy for the children of undocumented aliens in Plyler, his endorsement of the basic right of
women to choose in abortion cases, his acceptance of some degree
of affirmative action, and his opposition to victim-impact statements all show that he did appreciate the impact of law on people
with whom he had little contact. Powell's dedication to programs
designed to secure adequate legal services for the poor (pp. 197201), which led Jean Camper Cahn to stress his capacity for empathy in a letter supporting his nomination to the Court (p. 236), further illustrates Powell's ability to transcend his background in some
ways. But another part of Powell's difficulty with Bowers seems
symptomatic of the deeper limitations on Powell's vision. Not only
did Powell not know that he had worked with gays; according to
Jeffries's account of a conversation Powell had, Powell simply could
not comprehend either the emotional or the physical dimensions of
sexual attraction between men (p. 521).
Here Powell's experience as a lawyer is suggestive. Biographies
of lawyers-turned-judges regularly confront a problem in describing
their subjects' lives as lawyers: Neither the subjects nor their law
firms can release information on the lawyer's legal practice without
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the permission of clients and their successors. When, as with Powell, the clients are large corporations, it is basically impossible to
obtain detailed information about the lawyer's legal practice what he did between the time he arrived in the office each morning
and the time he left late in the evening.183
Jeffries's description of Powell's career before his appointment
to the Court, however, contains some hints about Powell's legal
practice. At least from the time Powell was a successful corporate
lawyer, his priva,te practice of law may well .have consisted of his
public career in the Richmond, state, and national bar associations;
service on the Richmond and state boards of education; service on
other public commissions; and service on corporate boards of directors. Being a successful corporate lawyer; that is, appears to consist
of rounds of meetings, some of which are designed to attract clients,
others of which consist of holding the hands of existing clients.184
Jeffries emphasizes how lonely Powell felt life at the Court to be,
precisely because there were no meetings (p. 335). At one point in
his career, Powell had been a successful civil trial lawyer, but by the
time he went on the Court, the actual lawyering he did appears to
have consisted of reviewing the work of his subordinates, dictaphone in hand, commenting on what they had produced and suggesting revisions or additions.1ss
Powell's legal pq1.ctice, then, did not expose· him to the wide
range of human experiences that might have expanded his social
vision. As a lawyer, Powell "worked chiefly with people" (p. 335),
but the people he worked with were dtawn from a relatively narrow
range. His public service also might have exposed him to a wider
range of people, but in fact it did.not. During the 1950s and 1960s,
a lawyer who was successful in the internal politics of bar associations had to have certain political skills, but he did not need to
reach out to widely diverse .constituencies for support.
Powell might have transcended the limitations of his background by engaging in the rough-and-tumble of public politics. To
do so, however, he would have had to be quite a different person.
In making this suggestion, I am not arguing we ought to draw our

183. Jeffries provides a few anecdotes about Powell's legal work. One culminates in a
visit by Powell to an alumnus of his own college, who expedited the approval of a securities
registration Powell was seeking - an example of lawyering as the use of "[t]he old-boy
network." P. 52.
184. Powell's experience as a lawyer made him comfortable with the business and commercial cases on the Court's docket Understandably, Jeffries devotes no attention to those
cases.
·. 185. Jeffries describes Powell's style of working on opinions in a similar manner. P. 295;
see also p. 478.
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Justices solely from the ranks of experienced politicians.1s6 My suggestion is more limited and conditional: If a judge adheres to a
jurisprudence of balancing, as Powell did, it would be desirable for
that judge to have a capacious social vision. Judges who lack such a
vision may not do a good job in balancing competing interests because they do not fully appreciate the range of interests at stake.
Perhaps a judge like Powell would have done better as a
formalist. 187

186. I have made something like that suggestion before, see Mark Tushnet, Constitutional
Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747 (1992}, but I now believe that
my argument was too broad.
187. I am indebted to my students in constitutional law during the fall quarter of 1994 for
helping me see this point

